

INFORME

DEL CENTRO MEMORIAL DE LAS VÍCTIMAS DEL TERRORISMO

— No. 1 • FEBRUARY 2017 —

THE FEAR STRATEGY

ETA and the Spiral of Silence
in the Basque Country



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THE FEAR STRATEGY

ETA and the Spiral of Silence in the Basque Country¹

Francisco J. Llera
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INTRODUCTION

Fear is a lethal strategic weapon of the asymmetric “war” commonly used by terrorist groups also considered to be a form of diffuse victimisation that conditions opinions, attitudes and social behaviour in

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a more or less generalised way or segmented for certain groups in a society that seeks to fragment and segregate. This is how terrorists try to achieve their objectives in practice, with an amplifying effect on the dynamics of the violent actions of their followers, while on the one hand they clean the streets of the obstacle of those who oppose them, on the other hand they subject the rest of society to the law of silence, whether they are accomplices or not.

It also represents an asymmetrical struggle for the control of public space whereby public opinion plays a fundamental role, especially in democratic societies, something that has been understood and studied by reference authors such as A. Schmid and J. De Graf (1982) Ch. Ewitt (1990 and 1993) at an international level and among us, by J. Linz (1986: 617-665), A. Muñoz Alonso (1982, 1985, 1986 and 1988) or, more recently, by U. Cuesta, M^a J. Canel and M. García Gurrionero (2012). All of them show that the study of the formation of climates of opinion in the communicative processes in which terrorist action intervenes is a scientific and political objective of the highest priority.

With this same perspective but in a different context, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, from the Allensbach Centre for Demoscopic Research, which she founded in 1947, and after a long trajectory of research mainly about the electoral behaviour in Germany and the effects of communicative processes on the creation of climates of opinion, developed her explanatory paradigm of the so-called *spiral of silence*,² stating that individuals tend to hide their opinions in a group or social context in which they feel “minoritised” for fear of being stigmatised, isolated or repressed by the hegemonic majority. Soon after, Juan Linz, with his Data demoscopic team, echoed Noelle-Neumann’s findings and, among other contributions, created an indicator meant to translate the German model to the tragic situation in the Basque Country at

² Made public in the 1970s in two initial scholarly texts in English (1974 and 1977), developed in his work *Die Schweigespirale. Öffentliche Meinung-unsere soziale Haut* (1980), later published in English (1985) and with several editions in Spanish (the last one in 2010).

the end of the 1970s. This is how the serial question that our research group has been using systematically and which will be the object of this analysis was first forged and tested in its 1979 survey.³ Precisely from those initial analyses, he goes on to emphasize the asymmetric impact of the fear in the Basque society (1986:16ss). Years later, Alejandro Muñoz Alonso would write more extensively about “the spiral of silence in the Basque Country” (1988) and M^a Jesús Funes, a decade later, would characterise the civil society mobilizations against terrorism as a “way out of silence” (1998). It is significant because during those years of maximum deadly activity of ETA and until 1982 when a sector of political-military ETA announced its dissolution, almost nobody had been academically concerned with ETA terrorism, an exception being the works of Federico de Arteaga on ETA and the Burgos trial (1971), Ángel Amigo on *Pertur* and ETAp_m (1978), the first history of ETA by José M. Garmendia (1980), Nacho Arregi’s documentary work on the Basque nationalist umbrella group (KAS) of the new MLNV (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco*, Basque National Liberation Movement; 1981), Gurutz Jauregi’s great doctoral thesis on the roots, the ideological and strategic evolution of ETA (1981) and one of Alejandro Muñoz Alonso’s first works on terrorism in Spain (1982).

However, this indicator on the “perception of the existence of fear” in the search for the socio-political impact of ETA terrorism on the Basque civil society has been followed by others, of which we will highlight those that are more specific and have a longer time span. Thus, in our 1987 study, commissioned by the Basque Government in which professors Juan José Linz and Francisco Llera worked together on the questionnaire during the latter’s stay at Yale University, a new indicator was introduced on the “feeling of freedom to talk about politics”, which completed and enriched the previous one in the search, precisely, for

³ He begins his *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Conflict in the Basque Country) with a revealing epigraph (“Fear, a factor in political life in the Basque Country”), in which he explains the reason for this indicator and the first results of his analysis.

the effects of the *spiral of silence* in Basque society and of which we have a long time series. Likewise, in the 1978 and 1979 surveys conducted by Linz, he included his question on the “image of ETA activists”, a loan taken from another study of that time in Northern Ireland⁴ (1986:630s) and which we reproduced from 1989 onwards in another questionnaire drawn up jointly with Prof. Linz for the study 1,795 from CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Sociological Research Centre) and later in the Euskobarometer itself. Nonetheless, starting with 1981 and a survey commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior, we have had a very direct indicator on “attitude towards ETA”, with a wide longitudinal range. Then finally, in the same 1989 CIS study 1,795 Linz and Llera introduced the indicator on “the possibility of defending all ideas without resorting to violence”, which we have continued to use periodically until the end of terrorism. Subsequently and already in the series of the Euskobarometer per se, we have created two new indicators: one on the perception of the increase in social tension for political reasons (since 1999) and another on the predilection to go and live outside the Basque Country (since 2000).

Lastly, it should be noted that the continuous analysis of these indicators is included in a whole series of our publications such as books (Llera, 1994 and Llera and Retortillo, 2005 and 2006),⁵ chapters in collective books (Llera, 2003, 2010, 2012 or 2016; Shabad and Llera 1995) or articles in academic journals (Llera, 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c or 2013).

⁴ Northern Ireland Attitude Survey, 1978.

⁵ These two publications coordinated by Francisco J. Llera and Alfredo Retortillo (2005 and 2006) correspond to a series of five national surveys, carried out and published between 2004 (CIS study no. 2,562) and 2008, thanks to the support and funding of the FVT (*Fundación Víctimas del Terrorismo*, Victims of Terrorism Foundation).

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND FEAR

Terrorism is now a prolific field of political science research, in line with the importance that this phenomenon has acquired in global society following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Many and varied are the issues analysed in relation to this type of violence, one of which is the consequences generated by it, although this topic is less abundant (Krueger, 2007). Traditionally, the academic world has been more concerned with the economic, social and electoral repercussions of terrorism, leaving aside the research on victims, although it is true that this gap is now being filled, both internationally (Argomaniz and Lynch, 2015; Lynch and Argomaniz, 2014) and in the specific case of Spain. For example, the victims of ETA have been studied from a qualitative point of view (Alonso et al., 2010); quantitative databases have been created of both those who have been murdered (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2004)⁶ and those who have been kidnapped (Llera and Leonisio, 2015); the discourse of the political forces with respect to the victims has been analysed (Leonisio, 2013), as well as their evolution as an interest group (Alonso, 2016) and the image of the victims in Spanish public opinion (Llera and Retortillo, 2005).⁷

ETA's terrorist violence has left many victims. Undoubtedly, the main ones were the over 800 persons killed (plus their relatives) but there have also been almost a hundred people kidnapped, more than

⁶ The database at the end of the Foronda Report (López Romo, 2015) is also very useful in this regard. It is true that fewer variables appear than in De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca's, but they do include the victims of various extreme right-wing terrorisms and parapolice violence.

⁷ The victims of other terrorist acts in Spain are another pending subject of academic research. See Llera (2013: 4).

20,000 direct victims of attacks (wounded and affected) throughout Spain and not just in the Basque Country (Llera, 2013: 8), considerable material damage, several thousand people threatened⁸ who were forced to live with a police escort for a period of their lives, which Gesto por la Paz defined as “violence of persecution” (Gesto por la Paz, 2000)⁹ and finally Basque society itself in general, which has been altered by a phenomenon that has prevented it from consolidating as a fully democratic political community equivalent to the societies around it.

One of the main characteristics of this lack of normality has been fear. Florencio Domínguez, in his book *Las raíces del miedo* (The Roots of Fear), made it abundantly clear as early as 2003 (p. 17): “The history of the last 25 years in the Basque Country cannot be understood in all its complexity if a factor that has been pervading it throughout this period is not taken into account: fear. A notable part of its population, possibly the majority, has lived this time under fear, varying in intensity depending on the period. This feeling, denied and hidden most of the time, has often conditioned the behaviour of the citizens, has deeply altered basic social values and has distorted public life”. In fact, any observer of the Basque social reality in recent decades cannot ignore the fact that fear has been a daily reality, at least for part of society. Fear of physical harm (sometimes irreversible) or destruction of property, but also of marginalization or social void, including stigmatization as “Spanish”, “Spaniard” or “pro-Spanish”, is something which in certain milieux was (or is) equivalent to an enemy to be fought off. For Alonso and Casquete (2014: 74) one of the key factors that helped to spread this sense of fear was, in addition to the murders, the phenomenon of persecution violence.

⁸ An undetermined number of them also had to go into exile. For an approach to this little studied phenomenon see Calleja (1999) or Bezunartea (2014).

⁹ According to López Romo (2015: 104-106), up until 2001 there were some 15,649 threatened. For Gesto por la Paz (quoted in Llera, 2013: 8) there were around 40,000 throughout the period.

Instilling terror is one of the main objectives of terrorists (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011: 456) and is one of the fundamental elements in defining the very concept of terrorism (Krause, 2016: 81; Schmid, 2013, 87; Weinberg et al., 2004: 781-785). Thus, fear is one of the consequences of terrorism in the societies where it is present. In fact, for Max Abrahms (2016), if the success of terrorism were to be measured by the fear it causes, it could be said that this tactic has a 100% success rate. Its generalization often produces the appearance of the so-called *spiral of silence*. The Basque Country has been no exception in this respect, as non-nationalist sectors have seen their freedom of expression suppressed by terrorist violence (Spencer and Croucher, 2008). In 1986, within their study of public opinion in the Basque Country, Juan Linz and his team admitted that the answers given by some Basques to questions related to terrorism might have been influenced by this lack of freedom. Specifically, they pointed out that there was a fear of pressure from ETA sympathizers or that those who felt Spanish could not show their feelings of identity without this being perceived as a hostile act towards the Basque Country, all of which contributed to the creation of this *spiral of silence* (Linz et al. 1986: 625).

Fear is therefore one of the most important effects of terrorism. Because of this, it has received some attention from the social sciences, especially Psychology, generally through experiments (Kim, 2016; Martín-Peña and Varela-Rey, 2014, Small et al., 2006) but also through surveys (Friedland and Merari, 1985; Skitka et al., 2006). The analysis of public opinion has been scarcer and, as a rule, Political Science or Sociology have not given much importance to this issue. Some exceptions are the studies by Bozzoli and Müller (2011), Davis and Silver (2004), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Huddy et al. (2005) or Robinson (2009), although what they were trying find out was whether the consequences of fear had less or more impact on the support of certain anti-terrorist measures. In the Basque instance, there has been a scientific approach with the studies of Llera (1992b and 2012).

In the Basque case, despite the importance of the fear that ETA might have provoked in the society, studies have been scarce. The most notable exception is Florencio Domínguez's book, *Las raíces del miedo*, cited above. In this work, full of very valuable examples, the author studies in a qualitative way and with journalistic language the systematic harassment that many social groups (non-nationalist parties, judiciary, university professors, journalists...) have suffered from ETA and, consequently, the fear triggered in them. Then there is also the book by Dutch academic Jan Mansvelt Beck, *Territory and Terror. Conflicting nationalisms in the Basque Country*, which, despite its title, overlooks the issue of fear in the Basque population. The publication is practically dedicated to the history of nationalism and ETA violence from the point of view of the attacks and support for the gang, and only in a very tangential way does it speak of the fear that these have been able to provoke. There are also, in political science, the works of Llera (1992b y 2012). In addition, there are also some psychological studies, those already mentioned by Martín Peña and Varela-Rey (2014) and Spencer and Croucher (2008). Finally, the work of Doroteo Santos (2009) is particularly noteworthy. In this work (p. 10) Santos quotes a phrase from the book *Las raíces del miedo*: "The influence of fear in Basque society is profound: it conditions the daily lives of citizens and determines the political attitudes of many of them. Terrorism conditions everyone in the Basque Country" and then asks if there are any empirical data to corroborate this statement. That is precisely the aim of this report: to provide empirical data on the fear caused by ETA terrorism in the Basque Country, specifically the consequences it has had on political participation. Thus, in this work we will try to study the profile (both individual and contextual) of those people who, in the Basque Country, have been expressing fears about their involvement in politics.

This report covers a part of this gap in research on fear as an effect of terrorism (both at a general level and specifically in the Basque Country) by means of a quantitative study of the consequences that, in the form of fear, have led to violence by ETA in the Basque pop-

ulation, an organisation that still exists despite having declared the end of its terrorist campaign at the end of 2011. ETA is one of the oldest terrorist organisations in the world and the second most lethal in Western Europe, after the provisional IRA (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010: 208).

Created in the late 1950s, ETA has used violence since its inception, even though its first death was registered in 1968. During the dictatorship (and until the celebration of the first democratic elections in June 1977) its number of murders was relatively low (66 people, 7.8%)¹⁰ compared to its later activity, so basically it has been an organization that has confronted democracy by opposing it with its project for an independent, socialist and euskaldun Basque Country composed of the current Spanish autonomous communities of Euskadi and Navarre and the Basque territories of southwest France (included in the department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques, in the region of Aquitaine). Thus, the presence of political violence in the Basque Country has made this territory an exception in Western Europe (along with Northern Ireland).¹¹ This anomalous situation has posed a serious problem for the consolidation of democracy both in the Basque Country and in the rest of Spain, since it has had the effect, among many other things, of spreading fear of participating in politics and expressing opinions, especially in the Basque Country (as it can be seen below), and of distorting democratic representation through the assassination of political representatives. During the transition, several members of UCD (*Unión de Centro Democrático*,

¹⁰ Data obtained from “The victims of ETA dataset” of the Juan March Institute: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets.asp#eta> and from López Romo (2015: 121-148).

¹¹ For literature on the history of ETA and in general its milieu see the studies of Garmendia (1980), Jáuregui (1981), Sullivan (1988) Llera et al. (1993), Letamendia (1994), Domínguez (1998), Elorza (2000), Mees (2003), Mansvelt Beck (2005), Domínguez (2006), Muro (2008), Watson (2008) or Casquete (2009), and the more recent ones by Domínguez (2012), Fernández Soldevilla and López Romo (2012), Fernández Soldevilla (2013 and 2016), López Romo (2015) Whitfield (2014) or Leonisio et al. (2017).


Democratic Centre Union), a party in the Spanish government at the time, were murdered in the Basque Country¹² (although to a lesser extent, the AP [*Alianza Popular*, People's Alliance] and PSOE [*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] were also attacked). In addition, from 1995 onwards political representatives and militants of PP (*Partido Popular*, People's Party), PSOE, UPN (*Unión del Pueblo Navarro*, Navarrese People's Union) and UA (*Unidad Alavesa*, Alavese Unity) were harassed, their properties damaged and ultimately killed (about three dozen, some of them in the rest of Spain). In general, they were councillors from small towns, though ETA also assassinated well-known political leaders such as the former socialist Basque vice-president Fernando Buesa or the Basque parliamentarian Gregorio Ordóñez.

The disruption that the terrorist phenomenon has caused to the Basque and Spanish societies has been reflected in the concerns it has aroused in the two spheres of public opinion. As can be seen in figure 1, with different ups and downs depending on the context (economic crisis or ETA's own truces), terrorism has always been a matter of concern for Spanish citizens in general and the Basque Country in particular, with a significant peak at the turn of the century. From that moment on, the decrease is continuous in both spheres of public opinion and, with the economic crisis and the announcement of the cessation of violence by ETA, it collapses to insignificant levels. In 2013, merely 0.5% of the Spanish population and 2% of the Basque population said that terrorism was one of the three problems that most concerned them. However, as the figure shows, until recently it has been a very pressing

¹² We can imagine that in Navarre the situation was similar to that of the Basque Country, although we do not study it in this report due to a lack of data, as the Euskobarometer is limited exclusively to the Basque Country. However, in 2001 a survey was carried out in Navarre containing the question on the perception of fear and the results were that 62% perceived a lot or quite a bit and 32% little or nothing. That is, similar results to those in the Basque Country at the same time, which is why we think that the main conclusions of this report could be transferred to Navarrese society.

issue in both societies, reflecting the distortion that terrorist violence has caused in Spanish democracy.

FIGURE 1
Evolution of the perception of terrorism as a problem in Spain and the Basque Country (sum of the three main problems cited)



Source: CIS data bank and Euskobarometer time series

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Despite the complication of measuring fear in a population through a survey,¹³ the Euskobarometer Research Group has tried to achieve this in two different ways: 1) by measuring fear in society through the individual perceptions of those surveyed and; 2) indirectly, by asking them about their degree of freedom to talk about politics. For reasons of space in this report we will focus on the first of the variables: the perception of fear of participating in politics. Euskobarometer surveys have been systematically asking this question to Basque society since the year of its foundation in 1995, with some exceptions (February 1995, 1996 and 1997).¹⁴ Specifically, their formulation has been as follows: “It is said that in the Basque Country some people are afraid of participating actively or publicly in politics. Would you say that today in your immediate environment (town, neighbourhood or city), in general, people feel a lot of, quite a bit, little or no fear of participating actively and publicly in politics?”, leaving the interviewees to answer these four options (a lot, quite a bit, little or no fear). In other words, it is a question of investigating the social fear that exists, not asking the interviewees directly if they are afraid of participating in politics, but rather asking them if they believe that fear exists in their immediate environment or not.

¹³ There are certain questions that, because they are too personal, cannot be asked directly in a survey. The feeling of fear is one of them, so from the Euskobarometer Research Group, it has been done in an indirect way. Linz itself (1986: 16), the first one to ask this question, explained it in this way: “We would like to emphasize that the interviewee was not asked if he or she felt fear, a question that would have been indiscreet and offensive, but because of the climate of fear in his or her milieu. The logical thing is that the answer reflected the milieu among those who had more contact with the person interviewed, that is, among those who thought like him or her”.

¹⁴ Usually with a sample of 1,200 people. This number has sometimes varied upwards or downwards depending on various circumstances.

Figure 2 presents the series of this indicator from 1995 to the second half of 2016.¹⁵ It is a figure that is available on the website of the Euskobarometer Research Group,¹⁶ in the time series section. The evolution is very clear. Thus, from the mid-90s to 2003 (except for a single piece of data from 2000) what predominates in Basque society is the existence of a lot or quite a bit of fear of participating in politics. This is the period, let us remember, of the “socialisation of suffering”, of the truce in Estella with its *kale borroka*¹⁷ inflation and harassment of non-nationalist politicians and, lastly, of the post-truce terrorist offensive which was specially targeted at constitutionalist councillors from small towns.¹⁸ From 2003 and onwards, there is a clear change of course, coinciding with a dramatic drop in the death toll from ETA¹⁹ and the ceasefire of 2006. With the end of the truce, the tables were turned, and fear gradually increased until 2009 (with the arrival of Patxi López to the Lehendakaritza and the threat by ETA to its entire government), at which point Basque society was divided equally between those who believed that fear existed and those who did not.

¹⁵ Prior to this dataset, only the responses collected by Linz in his 1979 survey exist (Linz et al., 1986). On that occasion, 50% of Basques stated that they perceived a lot or quite a bit of fear and 47% little or none. That is to say, a perception very similar to that which more than 15 years later the Euskobarometer ascertained in the second half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. Although we have no empirical data to corroborate this, we can assume that the climate in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s was similar to that shown by the 1979 survey and the first years of the complete series of the Euskobarometer.

¹⁶ www.ehu.es/euskobarometro


¹⁷ For example, from 1994 to 1995 violent actions tripled (from 336 to 981) and 1996 and 1997, with just over a thousand each, were the years with the most *kale borroka* attacks, with more than 500 (Llera, 2013: 11).

¹⁸ Forty-four percent of those killed by ETA in 2000 were politicians, a figure that drops by 2001, but remains a significant 26 %. In fact, almost a third of all politicians assassinated by ETA were killed between 2000 and 2002. Data obtained from “The victims of ETA dataset” of the Fundación Juan March: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets.asp#eta>

¹⁹ Three people were killed in 2003 and none in 2004, 2005 and most of 2006, as the only fatal attack in that year (the one in Barajas T4) took place at the end of December.

2009 was the last year with fatalities in Spain and that is also reflected in the data. From that moment on, fear began to subside and took a big leap forward in 2011. Following the announcement of the definitive cessation of violence, in November 2011 the perception of fear was at its lowest historical value (24%), gradually declining from that year until it reached less than 20% in the last three waves, the lowest values in the whole series. It is obvious that this percentage shows us that Basque society is not yet in a situation of complete normality, but the trend indicates that little by little the anomaly of fear of participating in politics is being overcome.

FIGURE 2
Evolution of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country (1995-2016)



Source: Euskobarometer


To what extent do these numbers present us with a “normal” society? To answer we need a point of comparison, which is not an easy chore since, as far as we know, this indicator has only been used to analyse the Basque reality. There is, however, one exception and that is the studies on the perception of the victims of terrorism carried out by the Euskobarometer Research Group itself in the middle of the last decade.²⁰ This variable repeats in the studies covering the entire Spanish population in 2005, 2006 and 2008.

Figure 3 compares the Basque and Spanish societies in those three years. In the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in Spain was very low, around 15%, whereas at that time it was twice as high in the Basque Country and a few years earlier it had been above 50%. Since 2010, however, the fear has only decreased (accelerating since the definitive cessation of terrorism) and is now around 15%, the lowest level since the dataset exists. In other words, the differences are not significant, and the percentages tend to converge with those of Spanish public opinion ten years ago. This leads us to think that, after the abandonment of violence by ETA, the Basque Country is becoming a society comparable to the rest of Spain.

Back to the Basque Country, it must be said that, evidently, the data that have just been presented are not new since they can be consulted on the website of the Euskobarometer Research Group. Therefore, what this report aims to do is to analyse this indicator in greater depth in order to draw up a profile, both individually and contextually, of the perception of fear. In other words, we propose going beyond the timeline we have just discussed and analyse who perceived more fear in the Basque Country and under what circumstances. To do this, we will use all the waves of the Euskobarometer merged into a single database,

²⁰ The data can be obtained from the website of the Euskobarometer Research Group: www.ehu.es/euskobarometro, in the section “terrorism and victims” under the tab “Líneas de investigación”.

FIGURE 3
Evolution of the perception of the existence of fear of actively participating in politics in Spain, 2005-2008



Source: Euskobarometer

which allows a very precise analysis of both individual (socio-demographic and political) and contextual (measured both at a general and municipal level) characteristics of the thousands of people interviewed since 1995. Specifically, from 1995 to January 2016 there have been 36 waves in which this question has been asked, with a total of 46,084 Basques responding. In other words, we have a database with 46,084 cases, which was reduced to 44,036 since we eliminated from the database a little over 2,000 people who decided not to answer the question or who said they did not know. In any case, this is a very large number of cases that allows us to collect a wide statistical variability, which enriches the analysis in a substantial way.

Therefore, the dependent variable of this study we are trying to discuss is the perception of fear of participating in politics. Despite this being an ordinal variable, we have transformed it into a scale of 1 to 4 for better graphic visibility when cross-checking it with different inde-

pendent variables and for obtaining means that allow an easier reading of the data. In the same way, the transformation into a scale allows us to use linear regression analysis for multivariate analysis and thus to elaborate simpler statistical models than binomial or multinomial logistic regressions which should be used if the dependent variable is not interpreted as a scale. Linear regression was preferred over probit models due to its simpler interpretation of the coefficients.


So, figure 4 reproduces figure 2 but with the dependent variable measured as a scale from 1 to 4. Therefore, the evolution shown in the graph is that of the annual means of the fear perception variable.²¹ A mean of 1 would indicate that all the interviewees have answered in a wave that they do not perceive any fear and, vice versa, a mean of 4 would denote that the whole sample has perceived a lot of fear. Obviously, these are two extreme values that never occur. Thus, the closer the mean of the scale is to 4, the more the fear, and the closer it is to 1, the less the fear. Figure 4 presents the evolution we have mentioned above with a drop of just over one point from the maximum level of fear (1998 with a mean of 2.84) to the minimum of 2016 (1.76).

Once we have defined the way in which we are going to treat the dependent variable, we proceed to define the independent variables (that is, those that explain the previous one). As we have been saying, there are two types of variables: individual and contextual. As far as the former are concerned, our main hypothesis is that, as ETA has directed its attacks against the non-nationalist sector of the population, this has been the sector that has had the greatest perception of fear. We will measure this issue through three variables: *subjective national identity*, a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is only Spanish, 2 more Spanish than Basque, 3 equally Basque and Spanish, 4 more Basque than Spanish and 5 only Basque; *Basque nationalist*, a binary variable where 1 means

²¹ From here, in all the graphs we will present the data by years and not by waves so that the fact that there are years with only one wave does not distort the visualization.

FIGURE 4

Evolution (annual mean values) of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country (1995-2016)



Note: The graph is made as a scale of 1 to 4 from an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 (none), 2 (little), 3 (quite a bit), 4 (a lot).

Source: Euskobarometer

to declare oneself a Basque nationalist and 0 as not to do so; and finally the *vote recollection*, grouped in *abertzale* left (including Aralar), PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, Basque Nationalist Party; including the coalition with EA when it happened), EA (*Eusko Alkartasuna*, Basque Solidarity), non-nationalist right (PP and UA), PSE and finally others (rest of parties, abstention and DK/DA). Our expectation is that voters from non-nationalist parties, those who feel less Basque and those who do not declare themselves nationalists, will perceive more fear because these groups are the ones who have been hit the hardest by the violence of ETA and its milieu. These three independent variables will be cross-checked with the *fear* variable in order to elaborate a singularized anal-

ysis and test our hypothesis. However, to elaborate multivariate statistical models, a series of control variables will be used to check that the relationships we find are not spurious. These will be the following: *Origin* (being 1 born in the Basque Country of Basque parents, 2 born in the Basque Country of mixed parents, 3 born in the Basque Country of immigrant parents and 4 immigrant), *Education Level* (grouped in 1 without education, 2 primary education, 3 secondary education, 4 Vocational Training and 5 higher education), position in the *Left-Right Scale* (scale from 1, extreme left, to 10, extreme right),²² *Religiosity*, divided into Catholics (sum of very good Catholic and practicing Catholic), Cultural Catholics (sum of little practicing Catholic and not at all practicing Catholic), Atheists and other responses (other religions, indifference and DK/DA), *Sex and Age*.

As far as the contextual variables are concerned, our main hypothesis is that there is more fear primarily when ETA is active and secondly in those places where it has hit hardest. As for the general contextual variables, applicable to the entire sample at a given time, it seems that whether ETA is active or not is key. Thus, we have elaborated the binary variable *Activity* which takes the value 0 when ETA is no longer active (that is, in the Euskobarometers from November 2011) and the value 1 when it is active, even if it has not killed anyone in the last 6 months (the rest of the waves). We expect, looking at the figure above, that the mean of the *fear* variable will decrease in periods of inactivity of ETA and increase in those of activity. In addition, we have developed a quantitative variable that measures the number of people killed by ETA (both in the Basque Country and in the rest of Spain) in the six months prior to each wave of the Euskobarometer.²³ The hypothesis is that the

²² In order not to lose the cases of DK/DA (which represent 10% of the entire sample) we have transformed the scale into a qualitative variable whose values are left (positions 1 and 2), centre-left (3 and 4), centre (5 and 6), centre-right (7 and 8), right (9 and 10) and DK/DA.

²³ Data obtained from “The victims of ETA dataset” of the Juan March Institute: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets.asp#eta> and from López Romo (2015: 121-148).

greater the number of deaths, the greater the fear. On the other hand, by knowing the municipality where each respondent lives, we can elaborate more specific contextual variables that are not shared by the whole sample, but only by the neighbours of the same municipality. Thus, we have elaborated the following municipal contextual variables: *ETA attacks in the municipality* (per 1,000 inhabitants) in the six months prior to each wave of the Euskobarometer; the same for *Kale borroka attacks in the municipality*;²⁴ *Deaths in the municipality*, a binary variable that measures whether or not there has been a death (or more) in the municipality in the years prior to the survey being carried out; *Mayor's Office of the abertzale left*, which takes the value 1 if the mayor belongs to radical Basque nationalism (HB, EH, ANV, etc.) and zero for the rest of the political forces;²⁵ and *Census abertzale left*, which measures the percentage of the census that has voted for the different candidates of the radical nationalism in the previous autonomic elections (excluding Aralar).²⁶ Finally, as contextual control variables we have the province of residence and the population size of the municipality (measured as the logarithm of the census).

²⁴ The information on the ETA and kale borroka attacks has been provided by Florencio Domínguez.

²⁵ Variable obtained from the Ministry of the Interior (http://www.sefp.minhfp.gob.es/web/areas/politica_local/sistema_de_informacion_local_-SIL-/datos_legislaturas_1979_2015.html). Last access: 20-9-2016.

²⁶ Obtained from the Basque Government's electoral archive: <http://www.euskadi.eus/elecciones/>


RESULTS (1): BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Figure 5 and Table 1 present the crossing of the dependent variable *fear* with the independent *Basque nationalist* one. That is, the sample has been divided into two groups, Basque nationalists and non-nationalists, and the evolution by years of the *fear* variable (its annual mean values) in each of the two groups is presented. Figure 5 is very eloquent and shows how the line representing the fear of the non-nationalists has always been above that of the nationalists. In other words, those who have not declared themselves Basque nationalists have been perceiving more fear of participating in politics than those who have declared themselves *abertzale*. To give an example, in 2002 the mean is 2.79 for the former and 2.32 for the latter, almost half a point of difference which implies that the nationalists believed that there was little fear while the non-nationalists were more inclined towards it quite a bit. It is also noteworthy that in both groups the variable begins a gradual decline from 2009 and at the same time the difference between the two is narrowing. Although it is true that the lines do not cross, it seems that from 2014 the difference ceases to be significant.²⁷ Table 1 shows the mean of both groups for the whole period, as well as from 2012 (inactive ETA) and the periods of ETA activity (i.e. the context-independent variable *activity*). As can be seen, the nationalists are on average 0.4 points lower, something which is maintained in the periods of ETA activity but is halved when the terrorist group is not active. Thus, as shown in table 1, the period variable seems to be more influential for non-nationalists than for nationalists, meaning when ETA is inactive

²⁷ Indeed, this is what the contrast of distributions tells us (Mann-Withney's U test is no longer significant for the difference between Basque nationalists and non-nationalists since 2014).

the perception of fear reduces, but more in the non-nationalist than in the nationalist group.

FIGURE 5
Evolution (annual mean values) of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to nationalist sentiment (1995-2016)



Note: The graph is made as a scale of 1 to 4 from an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 (none), 2 (little), 3 (quite a bit), 4 (a lot).

Source: Euskobarometer

TABLE 1


Means of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *nationalist sentiment* and ETA activity

		FEAR MEAN VALUE
TOTAL PERIOD	Nationalist	2.1
	Non-nationalist	2.5
ACTIVE ETA	Nationalist	2.2
	Non-nationalist	2.6
INACTIVE ETA OR TRUCE	Nationalist	1.8
	Non-nationalist	2.0

Source: Euskobarometer

FIGURE 6

Evolution (annual mean values) of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *subjective national identity* (1995-2016)



Note: The graph is made as a scale of 1 to 4 from an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 (none), 2 (little), 3 (quite a bit), 4 (a lot).

Source: Euskobarometer

Figure 6 presents similar data to that of 5 but instead of dividing the sample between nationalists and non-nationalists we do so according to *subjective national identity*. In the figure we see four groups, and not five, because we have grouped the answers “only Spanish” and “more Spanish than Basque” because they represent similar positions. The first thing that calls our attention is that as we move from the most Spanish feeling towards the Basque exclusivity, the fear decreases. Secondly, the lines do not cross at any time and always move in the same direction going down and up more or less parallel, the same as in the previous figure. And, thirdly, in the last years the four groups seem to converge (except for the last data of the most pro-Spanish ones), diluting the differences statistically, but without crossing each other. Again, the means (see Table 2) show the same scenario as the figure. That is, in the three time divisions we make, fear is reduced as we move from “only Spanish” to “only Basque”, being the only ones that cross the “only Spanish” and “more Spanish than Basque”. Again, as in the previous period, ETA’s inactivity affects all groups, but more those who feel more Spanish than those whose predominant identity is Basque, thus repeating the same pattern we have just seen.

The last independent variable that we are going to examine in depth is the *vote recollection* (in regional elections). Figure 7 offers us the evolution of the non-nationalist right-wing voters (PP and UA), although due to the little presence of the other two we are practically talking about the PP (which represents 98% of the cases), the PSE, the PNV, the *abertzale* left, which includes Aralar but for the same reason as before it refers practically to the voters of the old Herri Batasuna (with the various names it has used), which are 89%, and finally we have grouped in one category of others the other parties, abstention, the blank ballot, the null vote and those who do not answer or do not remember which party they have voted for.²⁸ The figure and the table are very revealing. Thus, the voters of the parties most threatened by ETA are the ones who perceive more fear, especially those of the People’s Party. Then, distributed around the mean, there is the group referred to as “others”

TABLE 2

Mean of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *subjective national identity* and ETA activity

		FEAR MEAN VALUE
TOTAL PERIOD	Only Spanish	2.7
	More Spanish than Basque	2.7
	Equally Basque and Spanish	2.5
	More Basque than Spanish	2.3
	Only Basque	2.0
ACTIVE ETA	Only Spanish	2.8
	More Spanish than Basque	2.8
	Equally Basque and Spanish	2.6
	More Basque than Spanish	2.3
	Only Basque	2.1
INACTIVE ETA OR TRUCE	Only Spanish	2.4
	More Spanish than Basque	2.1
	Equally Basque and Spanish	2,0
	More Basque than Spanish	1.9
	Only Basque	1.8

Source: Euskobarometer

and, finally, the two electorates that perceive less fear in their milieu are the PNV and, above all, the radical Basque nationalism. As can be noted, there are times when the gap between the electorate of Batasuna and that of the PP is even greater than 1.5 points, which implies that the voters of both parties perceived reality very differently: some with fear and others without it.

²⁸ Others do not include EA, which is singled out, although it does not appear in this analysis due to its intermittence (in 2001 and 2005 it was in coalition with the PNV and in 2012 in EH Bildu). In the models of the multivariate analysis it will appear.


Again, as in the two previous examples, the lines do not cross (except for a few exceptions) and from the moment of the definitive cessation these seem to converge, with the disappearance of the differences between electorates, except for the popular one, which is the one that significantly continues to perceive more fear.²⁹ However, it is also among PP voters, together with those of the PSE, where the decline is greater, with more than one point, for example, between 2008 and 2016, which implies that both electorates have gone from perceiving fear to not doing so. On the other hand, once again we can see how the fact that ETA is not active is key, since the mean of the *fear* variable falls in all the electorates, although more in PP (-0.8) and PSE (-0.7) than in the others (-0.3 in the *abertzale* left and PNV and -0.4 in others).

In any case, with the data that we have analysed in this section it seems that the profile of the perception of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country has become clear. In other words, the evolution of fear throughout Basque society, which we saw in figures 2 and 4, has not been homogeneous, but rather there have been sectors of society that have perceived that there is more fear. This leads us to think, by approximation, that the people who voted for non-nationalist parties not only perceived more fear, but were also those who felt more fear individually, although this is still a hypothesis that we cannot confirm with the current data. Specifically, those who define themselves as non-nationalists, those who have a subjective national identity that includes Spain and socialist voters and, above all, PP voters have been the ones who perceived the greatest fear of participating in politics.

²⁹ It is true that the 2014 data for the PP is exceptional because it is the electorate that perceives the least fear. This could be due to the small sample of popular voters in that year (in the two rounds, only 18 people out of a sample of 1,200 said they had voted for the PP, the smallest number in the whole series). In any case, the difference in the means is not statistically significant.

FIGURE 7

Evolution (annual mean values) of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *vote recollection* (1995-2016)



Note: The graph is made as a scale of 1 to 4 from an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 (none), 2 (little), 3 (quite a bit), 4 (a lot).

Source: Euskobarometer

As for the contextual variables, we have been seeing that ETA activity seems to be key to perceiving fear: the mean in the global sample is 2.4 when ETA is active and 1.9 when it is inactive starting from the second wave of 2011. With regard to the number of deaths during the six-month period (at a general level), it should be said that this correlates positively with the *fear* variable ($R=0.099$ if <0.001), in other words, the greater the number of ETA murders both in the Basque Country and outside it, the greater the sense of fear.

TABLE 3

Mean of the perception of the existence of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *vote recollection* and *ETA activity*

		FEAR MEAN VALUE
TOTAL PERIOD	Right non-nationalist	3.0
	PSE	2.6
	Others	2.4
	PNV	2.2
	<i>Abertzale</i> left	1.9
ACTIVE ETA	Right non-nationalist	3.1
	PSE	2.7
	Others	2.4
	PNV	2.2
	<i>Abertzale</i> left	2.0
INACTIVE ETA OR TRUCE	Right non-nationalist	2.3
	PSE	2.0
	Others	2.0
	PNV	1.9
	<i>Abertzale</i> left	1.7

Source: Euskobarometer

With respect to the specific contextual variables of each municipality, it should be noted that both ETA attacks, with or without deaths ($R=0.051$ ff <0.001) and, above all, *kale borroka* ($R=0.129$ ff <0.001), correlate significantly and positively with the perception of fear (that is, the more attacks by both ETA and *kale borroka* in the locality of the interviewee, the greater the sensation of fear). Therefore, physical proximity to the actions of ETA and their milieu also had an influence on the perception of fear and not only the global actions of the terrorist group, which in general citizens knew only through the media. Finally, the percentage of votes for the *abertzale* left is significant and negative

(i.e. the more votes for IA in previous regional elections in the locality of the interviewee, the less fear is perceived in the milieu). It could be argued that these correlations are artificial because of the great relevance of the years after 2011 when ETA is already gone. However, as shown in Table 4, if we only take the waves prior to 2012 the effect is also significant and pointing in the same direction (although it is true that with a somewhat lower R for Pearson).

TABLE 4
Correlations (Pearson's R) between the *fear* dependent variable and different contextual variables

	Year Total	Active ETA
Number of deaths in the previous semester	0.099**	0.051**
ETA attacks in municipality during previous semester	0.051**	0.028**
<i>Kale borroka</i> attacks in municipality during previous semester	0.129**	0.098**
% Vote (over census) to the <i>abertzale</i> left	-0.069**	-0.010

Source: Euskobarometer

On the other hand, the fact that there has been a murder by ETA in the municipality where the respondent lives also seems to have an influence. Thus, for the general sample when there have been no murders in the previous year³⁰ the mean of the *fear* variable is 2.3 whereas it rises to 2.7 when there have been.³¹ The party that holds the mayor's office, however, does not seem to have any influence (see table 5), if anything, a lesser sense of fear in those town halls where other parties (mostly independent groups) are in power.

³⁰ If we measure the previous two years, the means are practically identical.

³¹ With the same difference in means if we take only the data prior to 2011.

TABLE 5

Mean values regarding the perceptions of fear of participating in politics in the Basque Country according to *mayor's political party* and ETA *activity*

		FEAR MEAN VALUE
TOTAL PERIOD	PP	2.4
	PSE	2.4
	Others	2.1
	EA	2.3
	PNV	2.2
	<i>Abertzale left</i>	2.3
ACTIVE ETA	PP	2.6
	PSE	2.5
	Others	2.4
	EA	2.3
	PNV	2.4
	<i>Abertzale left</i>	2.5
INACTIVE ETA OR TRUCE	PP	2.1
	PSE	2.3
	Others	1.7
	EA	2.2
	PNV	2.1
	<i>Abertzale left</i>	2.0

Source: Euskobarometer

RESULTS (2): MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In this section we take another look at the relationship between the dependent variable (*fear*) and the various independent variables, but instead of doing so in a bivariate way we do it by using multivariate models. In other words, we analyse once more the relationships with the independent variables that have turned out to be significant but this time in a simultaneous way and with a series of controls in order to be sure that the significance obtained in the previous point is not due to spurious relationships. Thus, in table 6 three linear regression models are presented: Model 1 (the entire period), Model 2 (active ETA, i.e. before November 2011) and Model 3 (inactive ETA, from that date). Here we analyse the influence of the three individual variables that we studied earlier and that were found to be significant (*voting*,³² *subjective national identity*³³ and *nationalist sentiment*³⁴) with a series of controls, also individual: *Origin* (born in the Basque Country to mixed parents; born in the Basque Country to immigrant parents and immigrant, *ref*: born in Euskadi to Basque parents); *Education Level* (without education, primary education, VT and higher education, *ref*: secondary); *Position on the Left-Right Scale* (left, centre-left, centre-right, right and DK/DA, *ref*: centre); *Religiosity* (practicing Catholics, atheists and other responses, *ref*: cultural Catholics), *Sex* (*ref*: woman), *Age* (measured in years) and finally controls by survey being always the references the first and last one.

³² PNV (or PNV-EA for the recollection of 2001 and 2005), *abertzale* left (including Aralar), PSE-EE, right non-nationalist (PP and UA), EA and others (which is the category of reference in the models).

³³ Only or more Spanish, more Basque, only Basque and DK/DA, *ref*: equally Basque and Spanish.

³⁴ Basque non-nationalist and DK/DA with the nationalist category as variable of reference.

Model 1 in table 6 shows how, for the entire period and once all the controls have been introduced, the variables of *identity*, *nationalist sentiment* and *vote recollection* (except voting for EA) are significant and go in the expected direction: the perception of fear increases when one considers oneself to be only or more Spanish than Basque, declares oneself to be non-nationalist or to have voted for PSE or PP, while it decreases when one considers oneself to be only Basque or more Basque than Spanish, declares oneself to be nationalist or to be a voter for the PNV or the *abertzale* left. For example, feeling only Spanish or more Spanish than Basque (with respect to those who consider themselves equally Basque and Spanish) increases 0.1 points on the scale of fear while being a voter of the PP or UA (with respect to the category of others) does so by 0.37. With regard to the control variables, the least fear is noted in those declaring to be left wing or centre-left (positions 1 to 4), the greatest fear is noted in those declaring to be centre-right (7 and 8) and non-significance is also given (due to lack of sample, although in the direction expected of those of the right-wing). The origin does not seem to have any influence, but education (with more fear among those with secondary education) and religion (with less fear of atheists or other responses) do. In this way a PP voter, who feels only or more Spanish, who declares himself to be non-nationalist and who is ranked at 7 on the left-right scale would be 0.567 points above the constant, so he would be at 3.031. Conversely, a voter of the *abertzale* left who declares himself to be a nationalist, feels that he is only Basque and ranks at 2 on the left-right scale would be 0.532 points below the constant, i.e. 1.932. Either way, the first individual would seem to perceive quite a bit of fear in his milieu to participate in politics while the second would respond that he perceives little.

Like we explained before, a key variable to understanding the perception of fear is the activity of ETA itself. In the previous figures we have seen how most lines tend to converge after the definitive cessation. Hence, in table 6 we have replicated model 1 for two different periods: before November 2011 (active ETA) and after that date (inactive ETA).

The second model is very similar to the first one, the difference being in the third one, that is, in the period in which ETA is no longer active. Thus, as can be intuited from the figures in the previous point, the difference in the perception of fear between nationalists and non-nationalists disappears in this second stage. The identity continues to be significant (although with a minor significance of those who answer more Basque than Spanish) and in terms of voting, the Socialists stop perceiving fear in a significant way and the PP voters continue to do so, but with less significance and less intensity.

TABLE 6

Linear regression models for fear perception over the whole period, time of active ETA and time of inactive ETA (individual variables)

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
	TOTAL PERIOD		ACTIVE ETA		INACTIVE ETA	
<i>Identity</i>	Beta		Beta		Beta	
Only or more Spanish	0.102**	(0.016)	0.073**	(0.017)	0.207**	(0.037)
More Basque than Spanish	-0.127**	(0.013)	-0.137**	(0.014)	-0.074*	(0.029)
Only Basque	-0.288**	(0.014)	-0.315**	(0.016)	-0.162**	(0.031)
DK/DA	-0.057**	(0.022)	-0.064**	(0.023)	-0.045	(0.057)
(Ref: Equally Basque and Sp.)						
<i>Nationalism</i>						
Non-nationalist	0.043**	(0.013)	0.058**	(0.014)	-0.007	(0.028)
DK/DA	-0.019	(0.018)	-0.015	(0.020)	-0.044	(0.044)
(Ref: Nationalist)						
<i>Vote recollection</i>						
PNV	-0.105**	(0.012)	-0.115**	(0.013)	-0.036	(0.027)
PSE	0.149**	(0.014)	0.178**	(0.015)	-0.018	(0.033)
EA	-0.012	(0.038)	-0.013	(0.040)	-0.078	(0.142)
Spanish right wing	0.373**	(0.021)	0.395**	(0.023)	0.128*	(0.063)
Abertzale left wing	-0.082**	(0.016)	-0.086**	(0.019)	-0.086**	(0.032)
(Ref: Others)						

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<i>Origin</i>						
Basque (non-Basque parents)	0.018	(0.012)	0.022	(0.014)	0.011	(0.029)
Basque (mixed parents)	-0.009	(0.013)	0.005	(0.015)	-0.053	(0.029)
Non-Basque (Ref: Basque, Basque parents)	-0.008	(0.012)	0.000	(0.013)	-0.034	(0.029)
<i>Ideology</i>						
Left	-0.162**	(0.016)	-0.169**	(0.018)	-0.112**	(0.035)
Centre-left	-0.082**	(0.010)	-0.089**	(0.011)	-0.040	(0.023)
Centre-right	0.049*	(0.020)	0.034	(0.022)	0.158**	(0.057)
Right	0.067	(0.060)	0.034	(0.066)	0.325*	(0.148)
DK/DA (Ref: Centre)	-0.025	(0.016)	-0.059**	(0.017)	0.153**	(0.041)
<i>Education Level</i>						
Without education	0.102**	(0.020)	0.092**	(0.022)	0.098	(0.055)
Primary education	0.070**	(0.013)	0.079**	(0.014)	-0.003	(0.032)
Higher education	0.051**	(0.011)	0.079**	(0.012)	-0.062*	(0.025)
VT (Ref: Secondary)	-0.008	(0.012)	0.010	(0.013)	-0.077**	(0.026)
<i>Religion</i>						
Practicing Catholic	0.018	(0.011)	0.013	(0.012)	0.024	(0.029)
Atheist	-0.100**	(0.014)	-0.122**	(0.016)	-0.013	(0.028)
Other responses (Ref: cultural Catholic)	-0.043**	(0.013)	-0.054**	(0.014)	0.008	(0.028)
Sex (Ref: woman)	-0.004	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.009)	-0.006	(0.019)
Age	-0.001**	(0.000)	-0.001	(0.000)	0.000	(0.001)
(Constant)	2.464**	(0.029)	2.573**	(0.029)	2.172**	(0.054)
R2	0.157		0.147		0.043	
N	43,904		35,858		8,045	

Note: Typical errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 Although not shown for space reasons, all three models include survey controls (first and last as reference).

Given that the key period for understanding the perception of fear is prior to the definitive cessation of ETA terrorism, the model presented in this section is only calculated for the previous period. In addition to the individual variables included in the models in table 6, a series of contextual variables likely to influence the perception of fear were also added: number of people killed by ETA in the previous six months; number of ETA attacks (per 1,000 inhabitants) in the previous semester in the municipality where the interviewee lives; the same with *kale borroka*; whether or not there has been one or more assassinations by ETA in the municipality of the interviewee in the previous two years (binary variable); the percentage of votes (on the census) of the *abertzale* left in that municipality; whether or not the mayor's office is held by radical nationalism; and finally, as control variables, the size of the municipality and the province of residence of the interviewee.

Accordingly, table 7 shows the same model 2 used in table 6 but adds the contextual variables.³⁵ It should first be noted that, despite the addition of eight new variables, identity, voting and nationalist sentiment continue to be significant, pointing in the same direction and displaying similar importance. The new variables introduced are all significant except for those that refer to the mayor's office belonging to the *abertzale* left, the percentage of votes in favour of radical nationalism and one death in the municipality in the previous two years. What table 7 tells us is that the context, both general and municipal, also influences the perception of fear, meaning that it does not only relate to individual variables. As for the general context, it must be said that living in Álava or Biscay reduces the perception of fear in comparison to the inhabitants of Gipuzkoa. Also, each murder committed by ETA (anywhere) in the six months prior to the survey

³⁵ Unlike the previous model, data from the 1995 Euskobarometer are not included because for that year we do not know the municipality where the respondents live and therefore the municipal contextual variables cannot be used.

increases the perception of fear of the sample by 0.108. This is partly why the highest levels were generally found after the offensive that took place after the 1998-1999 truce. On the other hand, the context closest to each respondent also has its influence. That is, the fact that terrorism strikes close to their milieu has an impact on their perception of fear. Thus, each *kale borroka* attack per every thousand inhabitants in the municipality of the respondent increases the respondent's perception of fear by 0.131, while each ETA attack in the same conditions increases it by 0.380. What the latter data tells us is that such fear is not only the result of the influence of the media (which is how the vast majority of ETA's actions reached society), but also the close climate (not exclusively personal) has an important influence. It may be surprising that the variable that measures whether there has been a murder in the municipality in the previous two years is not significant. This may be due to a lack of variability (only 10% of cases are positive) or perhaps to the importance of the capital cities. In other words, in smaller municipalities one death may have a greater effect on the sensation of fear than in cities like Vitoria or Bilbao. Thus, carrying out the same linear regression but eliminating the three capitals from the analysis, the variable is significant ($p=0.019$) and in the expected direction, i.e. increasing the fear ($B=0.061$).

TABLE 7
Linear regression model for fear perception when ETA is active (individual and contextual variables)

<i>Identity</i>	Beta	
Only or more Spanish	0.081**	(0.018)
More Basque than Spanish	-0.148**	(0.015)
Only Basque	-0.328**	(0.016)
DK/DA	-0.079**	(0.024)
(Ref: equally Basque and Spanish)		
<i>Nationalism</i>		
Non-nationalist	0.052**	(0.015)
DK/DA	-0.014	(0.020)
(Ref. Nationalist)		
<i>Vote recollection</i>		
PNV	-0.103**	(0.013)
PSE	0.170**	(0.016)
EA	-0.047	(0.041)
Spanish right wing	0.403**	(0.023)
Abertzale left wing	-0.098**	(0.019)
(Ref: Others)		
<i>Origin</i>		
Basque (non-Basque parents)	0.017	(0.014)
Basque (mixed parents)	-0.001	(0.015)
Non-Basque	-0.010	(0.014)
(Ref: Basque, Basque parents)		
<i>Ideology</i>		
Left	-0.158**	(0.019)
Centre-left	-0.083**	(0.011)
Centre-right	0.051*	(0.022)
Right	-0.056	(0.071)
DK/DA	-0.049**	(0.018)
(Ref: Centre)		

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<i>Education Level</i>		
Without education	0.092**	(0.023)
Primary education	0.077**	(0.015)
Higher education	0.074**	(0.013)
VT	0.001	(0.013)
(Ref: Secondary)		
<i>Religion</i>		
Practicing Catholic	0.008	(0.013)
Atheist	-0.113**	(0.016)
Other responses	-0.048**	(0.014)
(Ref: cultural Catholic)		
Sex (Ref: Woman)	-0.009	(0.009)
Age	-0.001	(0.000)
<i>Mayor's office abertzale left (Ref: others)</i>		
	-0.042	(0.022)
<i>% vote abertzale left</i>	0.002	(0.001)
<i>ETA attacks x 1,000 inh.</i>	0.380*	(0.150)
<i>Kale borroka attacks x 1,000 inh.</i>	0.131**	(0.030)
<i>Deaths by ETA 6 months prior</i>	0.108**	(0.009)
<i>Death in municipality 2 years prior (Ref: no death)</i>	-0.007	(0.018)
<i>Province</i>		
Álava	-0.172**	(0.016)
Biscay	-0.140**	(0.012)
(Ref: Gipuzkoa)		
<i>LN Census</i>	0.028**	(0.003)
(Constant)	2.252**	(0.052)
R2	0.161	
N	33,727	

Note: Typical errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 **p<0.01. Although not shown for space reasons, the model includes controls per survey (first and last as reference).

CONCLUSIONS

The basic objective of this report was to explore in detail the perception of fear of participating in politics amongst Basque population. For this purpose, we have used the different waves of the Euskobarometer, which since 1995 have systematically included this indicator. Below, we detail the main conclusions that can be drawn from reading the data presented throughout the research work:

1. ETA's terrorist activity made the Basques fear participating in politics. The perception of fear displays a very clear timeline. Since the cessation of terrorism in November 2011, this perception has been decreasing (in fact, it had already been doing so for a couple of years) until it reached, in recent times, a very low level, similar to that declared by the Spanish people as a whole in the middle of the last decade. Before that date, during periods of truce or absence of lethal action by ETA, that sense of fear also diminished. These rises and falls were similar in the various political sectors into which we have divided the sample. Thus, for example, in May 2001, after breaking the Lizarra truce with the resumption of the attacks and in the middle of a campaign of harassment against constitutionalist politicians (coinciding with the autonomous elections of that year), 70% of the Basques perceived the growing fear in their milieu. Five years later, at a time when ETA was in a situation of ceasefire, only 24% did so.
2. The perception of fear has not had an impact on all ideological sectors as it has been clearly asymmetrical. Basque nationalists perceived less fear in their milieu than those who were not. In other words, PP and PSE voters were more afraid of participating in politics than PNV and *abertzale* voters. The means on the scale of perception of fear we have drawn up (which ranges from 1 to 4) are very explicit. The popular electorate has responded to the definitive cessation of ETA violence by about 3, which means that,

on average, they perceived a significant amount of fear of participating in politics. The mean value for the socialists, while lower, has also often positioned near that figure, which says that this electorate perceived fear. This has not been the case for nationalist voters. Thus, the electorate of the PNV and of the *abertzale* left has tended to position around 2, that is, on average they perceived that there was little fear of participating in politics in their milieu. Before the definitive end of ETA's terrorism, PP voters perceived (average for the period from 1995 to 2011) almost three times more fear (79% said a lot or quite lot) than those of the *abertzale* left (28%) and socialist voters almost the double (63%) than those of the PNV (37%). To sum up, until 2011, the vast majority of PSE and PP voters perceived, on average, fear to participate in politics in their milieu, while only slightly more than a third of the voters of the PNV and a quarter of the electorate of the *abertzale* left used to feel it.

3. Those who felt only Spanish or more Spanish than Basque also perceived a higher level of fear, while those who defined themselves as only Basque or more Basque than Spanish felt it less. Furthermore, those who considered themselves to be Basque nationalists were less self-conscious than those who did not define themselves as such. For example, in the period of activity of ETA, 64% of the persons who considered themselves nationalists declared that there was little or no fear in their milieu, a percentage that decreased by 20 points (44%) in the non-nationalist persons.
4. Therefore and in consonance with the objectives of the criminal group, the fact that there was an asymmetry in that emotion points to the hypothesis that freedom to participate in politics (a key pillar of any democratic society) was severely curtailed in the Basque Country. In other words, ETA meant a loss of the most basic democratic rights of citizens. The fact that this fear was not homogeneous, affecting the different electorates in an unequal way, leads to think that the non-nationalist formations (PP, PSE-EE, UPN, UA,

etc.) started from a position of disadvantage in the electoral contest and, therefore, it can be considered that the principle of political equality was partly distorted.

5. Both the general and the specific context of each municipality had an influence on the perception of fear. Thus, the more murders ETA committed in the months before the survey was carried out, the greater the fear was. According to our statistical model, each murder committed by ETA six months prior to the survey raised the fear scale by 0.108 points for the entire population. For instance, let us assume that in the first half of a year ETA did not kill anyone and the perception of fear on the scale was 2.3 points. If in the second half of the year ETA killed five people, this would be reflected in the next survey, raising the fear scale to 2.84 points.
6. The specific context (measured here at the local level) also has its influence. The greater the number of attacks by ETA (not necessarily fatal) and *kale borroka* in the municipality in which the respondent lives, the greater the perception of fear in the milieu. In other words, the physical proximity to the terrorist actions, which affects the social climate in an asymmetric way, increases the perception of fear - and not only the fact that ETA is generally more active. Thus, one ETA attack per thousand inhabitants (not necessarily with fatalities) increased the perception of fear by 0.38 points on the scale in the municipality where it took place. Each *kale borroka* attack per 1,000 inhabitants does so by 0.131. Again, let us imagine a municipality that has not suffered any ETA or *kale borroka* attacks in the first half of the year, where the perception of fear is also at 2.3. If in the following six months there is one ETA attack and five *kale borroka* attacks (per thousand inhabitants), the perception for the entire population increases by 1,035 points, standing at a mean of 3.33.

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CENTRO
MEMORIAL
DE LAS VÍCTIMAS
DEL TERRORISMO

**EUSKO
BAROMETRO**

Estudio periódico de la
opinión pública vasca

